A virtue ethicist might choose to define one of these—for example, the best action—in terms of virtues and vices, but appeal to other normative concepts—such as legitimate expectations—when defining other conceptions of right action.
Moreover, as noted above, virtue ethics does not have to be neo-Aristotelian. If it is the circumstances in which the agent acts—say that she is very poor when she sees someone drop a full purse or that she is in deep grief when someone visits seeking help—then indeed it is particularly admirable of her to restore the purse or give the help when it is hard for her to do so.
Determination might lead me to persist in trying to complete a difficult task even if doing so requires a singleness of purpose.
This highlights two important avenues for future research, one of which explores individual virtues and the other of which analyses how they might be related to one another. A virtue is a trait that contributes to or is a constituent of eudaimonia and we ought to develop virtues, the eudaimonist claims, precisely because they contribute to eudaimonia.
The most important distinguishing factor has to do with how motivations and dispositions are taken to matter for the purposes of explaining other normative qualities.
Nevertheless, the complaint that virtue ethics does not produce codifiable principles is still a commonly voiced criticism of the approach, expressed as the objection that it is, in principle, unable to provide action-guidance.
Moral purpose and moral responsibility. De Gruyter Verlag, pp. Other virtue ethicists wish to retain the concept of right action but note that in the current philosophical discussion a number of distinct qualities march under that banner.
They admit that, for them, cultural relativism is a challenge, but point out that it is just as much a problem for the other two approaches. In this section we consider eight objections, namely, the a application, b adequacy, c relativism, d conflict, e self-effacement, f justification, g egoism, and h situationist problems.
Someone who is generous, honest, compassionate, and courageous might not be a morally good person—or, if it is still held to be a truism that they are, then morally good people may be led by what makes them morally good to act wrongly! Others have been concerned that such an open-handed approach to the virtues will make it difficult for virtue ethicists to come up with an adequate account of right action or deal with the conflict problem discussed above.
What does moral understanding require, according to virtue ethics? Amongst the morally relevant features of a situation may be the likely consequences, for the people involved, of a certain action, and this is something that adolescents are notoriously clueless about precisely because they are inexperienced.
One is a simple confusion. Finally, one of the more productive developments of virtue ethics has come through the study of particular virtues and vices. University of Calgary Press, pp. We already have a passable idea of which traits are virtues and what they involve.
It came to be recognised that moral sensitivity, perception, imagination, and judgement informed by experience—phronesis in short—is needed to apply rules or principles correctly.
Insofar as the different versions of virtue ethics all retain an emphasis on the virtues, they are open to the familiar problem of c the charge of cultural relativity. It is possible to perform a right action without being virtuous and a virtuous person can occasionally perform the wrong action without that calling her virtue into question.
Although the intellectual virtues can be taught directly, the moral ones must be lived to be learned. New Philosophical Essays, Basingstoke: He pointed out that the agent who, rightly, visits a friend in hospital will rather lessen the impact of his visit on her if he tells her either that he is doing it because it is his duty or because he thought it would maximize the general happiness.
Eudaimonia is discussed in connection with eudaimonist versions of virtue ethics in the next. Although virtue ethics has grown remarkably in the last thirty-five years, it is still very much in the minority, particularly in the area of applied ethics.
There is now a growing movement towards virtues education, amongst both academics Carr ; Athanassoulis ; Curren and teachers in the classroom.
What is required is simply i that virtue is not reduced to some other normative concept that is taken to be more fundamental and ii that some other normative concepts are explained in terms of virtue and vice. Another reason MacIntyre gives for the doomed nature of the Enlightenment is the fact that it ascribed moral agency to the individual.
At the very least, an agent-based approach must be committed to explaining what one should do by reference to the motivational and dispositional states of agents.
To possess such a disposition fully is to possess full or perfect virtue, which is rare, and there are a number of ways of falling short of this ideal Athanassoulis Chapter Quiz. Launch Quiz. Designed to help you test your knowledge of chapter material, multiple-choice Chapter Quizzes provide instant feedback that helps you determine what you know.
In virtue ethics, moral conduct is supposed to radiate naturally from moral virtues. That is, moral actions are derived from virtues. A virtue is a stable disposition.
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View Chapter 17 and docx from PHIL at University of Texas. Chapter 17 1. According to virtue ethics, the fundamental moral question is: What kind of person should I be? 2. In the West, virtue%(1). Chapter Virtue Ethics I agree with Aristotle’s argument and conclusion that being virtuous person contributes so much to someone’s life with regards to going well.
The reason for this is that our ultimate goal ought to be self-sufficient.Download